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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HO\\ ... AR-D F. CORAY. Ancillary Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of William 
Frank Lucus, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOUTHER-N PACIFIC COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Case No. 7382 
Defenda;nt amd Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT O.F THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEl\1:ENT 
Parties will be designated as in the trial court. 
All italics are added. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Frank Lucus, an employee of defendant, 39 
years of age at the time of his death, was fatally injured 
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2 
while engaged in the performance of his duty as a signal 
n1aintainer on the main line track of respondent at a 
point approximately 3600 feet east of the east switch at 
L~emay, in Box Elder County, Utah, on the afternoon of 
the 24th ·day of May, 1944. Howard F. Coray, ancillary 
administrator, filed suit in the District Court of Weber 
County, Utah. 'This. case has been twice tried. The first 
trial resulted in a directed verdict of no cause of action 
in favor of defendant. Thereafter, the case was appealed 
to this Court which affirmd the judgment of the lower 
court at ________ , Utah ________ , 185 P. ( 2d) 963. The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari and re-
vers·ed the decision of this Court and remanded the case 
for a new trial, 69 !s.. Ct. 275 (Jan. 3, 1949). The case 
came on again for the second trial on th·e 25th day of 
May, 1949. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of 
action and judgment was entered accordingly (Tr. 145). 
D·ef.endant was charged with operating its eastbound 
freight train, First 582, consisting of 82 freight cars, a 
caboose and an engine, in violation of the Federal Safety 
Appliance Act, Sections 1, ·8, 9, 51 and 53 of Title 45 
U. S. C. A., in that it hauled and permitt~d to be hauled 
and used in interstate commerce PFE Car No. 29435 at 
a time when the threads on the triple valve were so badly 
worn that the triple union nut became disconnected from 
the triple valv·e, allowing the air in the brake line to 
escape to the atmosphere, thus causing the automatic 
air brakes on each car in the train to be set at once in 
emergency, bringing the moving train to an unexpected, 
undesired, abrup·t and sudden stop; that seconds after 
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the stop the track car, upon which deceased wa.s riding, 
Yiolently collided "'"i th the rear end of the train, causing 
his death. 
There \Yas no particular conflict in the testimony. 
The evidence conclusively demonstrated that the defend-
ant was guilty of the charged violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act, and it was stipulated that the train 
stopped because the triple union nut became disconnected 
from the triple valve · on PFE Car 29435 due to the 
threads on the triple valve being worn (Tr. 41). 
The Conductor, Darrel E. Jorgensen, was under 
orders to take the train onto the siding east of NewfoUJid-
land, and at the time of the accident he was making a 
run for that siding (Tr. 35-37). 
There was no doubt about the stop being an un-
desired, quick action stop, and that it was unexpected 
by the train crew and all concerned in the operation of 
the train (Tr. 37, 38). 
When Mr. Jorgensen first saw the track car upon 
which deceased was riding he thought it was about 500 
feet from the rear end of hi.s train (Tr. 38-40). 
Alvin 0. Lynch was riding on the track car with 
deceased at the time of the collision. He was being taken 
over the signal maintainer's territory by Lucus for the 
purpose of acquainting him with the signal maintainer's 
job at L·emay. Lynch testified that the track in the vicin-
ity of the accident ran east and west and that Lucus 
was sitting on the north side of the track car, facing 
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north, and that he, Lynch, was sitting on the .south side 
of the track car, facing south (Tr. 20). That immedi-
ately prior to the accident he, Lynch, was looking to the 
west watching a signal located at the east end of Lemay 
(Tr. 21). 
Mr. Jorgensen testified that both Lucus and Lynch 
were looking to the west as the track car, on which they 
were riding, approached the rear of the stalled train 
(Tr. 45). 
Lynch testified that the track car was not going at 
any excessive r,ate of speed and in his opinion wa.s pro-
ceeding at between 10 and 25 miles per hour (Tr. 22). 
All of the witnesses were of the opinion that the 
collision occurred within a very few seconds of the time 
the train came to a stop. 
The only person qualifying as a dependent heir of 
deceased was Edith B. Lucus, wife of Frank Lucus. De-
ceased and Mr.s. Lucus were married December 26, 1936 
(Tr. 77). During all hut the last year or two immediately 
preceding the death of Lucus they resided at Los Ang-
eles, California~ Both deceased and Mrs. Lucus were 
constantly employed during their married life. De-
ceased's earnings while in California ranged from $40.00 
to $50.00 per week (Tr. 79). From his earnings deceased 
contributed between $50.00 and $75.00 :p·er month to the 
support of Mrs. Lucus until 1941 when hi.s contribution 
became less (Tr. 82). In 1941 his contribution fell to 
$25.00 to $30.00 per month. 
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In .... -\ugust, 19-±2, Lucus began an action for divorce 
(Tr. 84). ~Irs. Lucus filed a counter action for separate 
n1aintenance (Tr. 85-86). In January, 1943, the matter 
"·as heard and Lucus \Vas ordered to pay $10.00 per week 
for the support of his wife (Tr. 87), starting vvith Feb-
ruary 1, 1943 ( Tr. 88). No further court proceedings 
'\vere had, and Mrs. Lucus never savv nor heard from 
Lucus again during his lifetime (Tr. 88). Mrs. Lucus 
made a search of available sources of information con-
cerning Lucus' vvhereabouts, but was unable to locate 
him. She remained at home and awaited his return, 
being sure that he would come back (Tr. 88-91). 
The court, over plaintiff's objection, allowed a certi-
fied copy of Mrs. Lucus' cross-complaint for separate 
maintenance to be introduced in evidence as Exhibit "2 ". 
Said exhibit contained allegations that Lucus had not 
supported Mrs. Lucus for over a year; that Lucus 
squandered his money on liquor, and drank to excess, 
and had refused to return to live with Mrs. Lucus even 
though she begged him to return and give up his bad 
habits and disreputable friends. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRO·RS 
1. The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 16. 
2. The Court erred in allowing the introduction of 
Exhibit "3 ", and giving Instruction No. 10. 
3. The Court erred in refusing plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 4. 
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4. The Court erred in giving Instruction No. 9. 
5. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 11. 
6. The Court erred in overruling plain tiff's motion 
for new trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT IF DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A COM·PLETE 
BAR TO RECOVERY. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3). 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL AND F AlLURE TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AND 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID IN INSTRUCTION 
NO. 9 ·CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR (Assignment 
of Errors 4 and 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PREJUDICIALLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY THAT IF DECEASED WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
TORY NE~GLIGENCE HIS NEGLIGENCE WAS A COMPLETE 
BAR TO RECOVER.Y. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, and 3). 
Section 53, Title 45, U.S.~C.A., provides in part -as 
follows: 
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"* * * That no such e1nployee \Yho n1ay be 
injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty 
of contributory negligence in any case where 
the violation by such common carrier of any 
statute enacted for the safety of employees con-
tributed to the injury or death of such employee.'' 
Sections 1, 8, and 9 of Title 45 U.S.C.A., are all 
statutes enacted for the safety of employees and they 
are the sections of the Code which defendant is charged 
with violating and which the court instructed the jury 
the defendant had violated (Instruction No. 5, J.R. 210). 
Yet, contrary to the provisions of ~section 53 and the 
fact that defendant had violated Sections 1, 8,_ and 9 
of Title 45 as matter of law, His Honor instructed the 
jury in Instruction No. 16 as follows (J.R. 210): 
''You are instructed that where an employee 
has two ways of performing an act in the course 
of his employment, the one safe and the other 
dangerous, he owes a positive duty to the em-
ployer to pursue the safe method, and any de-
parture from the p'ath of safety will prevent 
his recovery' if he is injured. '' 
The plain me~ning of this i~struction could only be that 
any negligence on the_ part of dec~ased would completely 
bar any recovery in this action. ~- The court then went 
on to instruct the jury as follows::' 
'' * * * Therefo~e, if you find that William 
Frank Lucus could hav-e in·~nipulated said. motor 
car with equal ease . from a position where he 
could have· obs~:r;ved the freight train proceed-
ing ahead of ·him, rather than ··a position with 
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his back towards the freight train, but that he 
did not do so but manipulated said motor car 
with his back to the freight train, and if you find 
that manipulating said motor car with his back 
to the freight train was not as safe as manipula-
ting said motor car facing the freight train and 
that William Frank Lucus thus chose an unsafe 
pooition, when a safe position was equally avail-
able to him, then William Frank Lucus, the de-
ceased, was guilty of negligence, and if such 
negligence, if you so find, was the sole proximate 
cause of deceased's injuries and death, then your 
verdict must be for the defendant 'no cause of 
action.' '' 
This instruction was not requested by defendant 
or plaintiff, but was given by the court on his own ini-
tiative. 
Plaintiff is unable to discover any case or statutory 
law which would justify an instruction that an employee 
muot at all times choose the safest method of :performing 
his work or be charge with negligence as a matter of law. 
In addition to the quoted instruction the court in-
structed the jury in Instruction No. 10 (J.R. 210) that 
the railroad company ''ha.s the legal right to make such 
rules and regulations for the conduct of its employees 
• * * and all employees while engaged in such service 
with a knowledge of such rules are exp,ected to follow 
and obey them.'' This instruction was given for the 
purpose of aiding the jury in its use of defendant's 
Exhibit "3." Defendant's Exhibit "3'' was allowed in 
the evidence over plaintiff's strenuous o hjection ( Tr. 
135). 
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The exhibit consisted of three rules taken from the 
railroad company's Rule Book. Rule 1112 dealt with 
track cars following moving trains, and stated (Tr. 136): 
'·,, .. hen following moving trains, track cars 
must remain not less than 400 feet to the rear 
of .same, * * * ' ' 
Rule 1119 is a cautionary rule concerning the speeds 
at which track cars may be operated, and states ('Tr. 
137): 
''Track cars must not under any circum-
stances be operated at a speed in excess of 15 
miles per hour, nor over road crossings at speed 
in excess of 4 miles per hour; and after dark or 
through stormy or foggy weather when visibility 
is p·oor, .speed shall be reduced to the absolute 
minimum consistent with safety. A constant and 
vigilant look-out must be maintained and speed 
controlled approaching interlocked derails and 
switches or those operated by remote control, so 
that stop can be made to avoid accident in the 
event the route is unexpectedly changed. Before 
rounding sharp curves or through tunnels and 
snowsheds where view is obscured, flagmen must 
be sent ahead for protection, if it cannot otherwise 
be positively determined that way is clear." 
Rule 1120 was the third railroad rule which defen-
dant was allowed to introduce into the evidence, and as 
far as material the rule provides as follows (Tr. 137): 
"* * * and further that lineups obtained 
from train dispatcher cannot always be depended 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
upon by reason of conditions unexpectedly chang-
ing in the meantime.'' 
The introduction of the rules and Instruction No. 
10 when taken together with Instruction No. 16, could 
have but one purpose, that being to lead the jury to 
believe that a disobedience of the railroad company's 
rules and regulations by Frank Lucus would be a ''de-
parture from the ·path of safety'' and would he a har 
to any recovery in this action. 
Instruction No. 16, Instruction No. 10 and the in-
troduction of Exhibit '' 3'' will be discussed together for 
they are all errors which go to the basic proposition that 
the Court instructed the jury that negligence on the part 
of Frank Lucus was a bar to his administrator's action. 
The authorities concerning these points will be 
discussed in the following order: the Supreme Court 
of the United States cases, other federal authorities, 
state decisions. 
The United States Supreme Court in Grand Trwnk 
Western RaJihoay Co. v. Lindsay, 2·33 U.S. 42, 34 S. Ct. 
581, 582, 58 L. Ed. 838, specifically disapproved a trial 
court'·s instruction containing somewhat similar lan-
guage. In the Lim.dsay case the plaintiff went between 
two cars where a defective coupler had failed to perform 
its function. The trial court in instructing the jury 
gave the following instructions: 
" 'You are further instructed that if you 
believe from the pre-ponderance of the evidence 
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that the plaintiff gave a 'come-ahead' sig11al to 
the s"~itchman or engineer, -one or both-and 
after that \vent betw··een the cars and wa.s injured, 
then you have a right to consider whether the 
giving of the 'come-ahead' signal by the plaintiff 
\Vas the proximate cause of the injury as dis-' 
tinguished from the condition of the coupler, and 
if you find that, under the circumstances, the 
'come-ahead' signal "\Vas the proximate cause of 
the injury, then your verdict must be for the 
defendant. 
'' 'You are also instructed that where there is 
a safe and a dangerous way of doing an act, and 
the servant uses a dangerous way and is injured 
thereby, he is charged with negligence on his p~art 
and may not recover.''' 
At a later point in its instructions the court -atated: 
" 'If, under . the employers' liability act, 
plaintiff's negligence, contributing with defen-
dant's negligence to the production of the injury, 
does not defeat the cause of action, but only les-
sens the damages, and if the cause of action is 
established by ·showing that the injury resulted 
'in whole or in part' from defendant's negli-
gence, the statute would be nullified by calling 
plaintiff's act the proximate cause and then de-
feating him, when he could not be defeated by 
calling his act contributory negligence. For his 
act was the same act, by whatever name it be 
called. It is only when plain tiff's act is the sole 
cause-when defendant's act is no ·part of the 
causation-. that defendant is free from liability 
under the act. ' '' 
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The evidence indicated that the jury might find 
that the plaintiff had given a come-ahead signal and 
after the come-ahead signal, walked between the cars 
where the defective coupler was located. There was other 
evidence to the effect that the come-ahead signal was 
from some lantern oth'er than plaintiff's. The Supreme 
Court in passing on the court's instructions, stated: 
'' * * * But having ·regard to the state of the 
proof as to the defect in the coupling mechanism, 
its failure to automatically work by impact after 
several efforts to bring about that result, all of 
which preceded the act of the switchman in going 
between the cars, in the view most favorable 
to the railroad, the case was one of concurring 
negligence; that is, was one where the injury 
complained of was caused both by the failure 
of the railway company to comply with the safety 
appliance act and by the contributing negligence 
of the switchman in going between the cars. 
Under this condition of things, it is manifest 
that the charge of the court was greatly more 
favorable to the defendant company than was 
authorized by the statute for the following rea-
sons: Although by the 3d section of the em-
ployers' liability act a recovery is not prevented 
in a case of contributory negligence, since the 
statute substitutes for it a system of comparative 
negligence, whereby the damages are to be di-
minished in the ·proportion which his negligence 
bears to the combined negligence of himself and 
the carrier,-in other words, the carrier is to be 
exonerated from a proportional part of the dam-
ages corresponding to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the employee (Norfolk & W. R. 
Co. v. Earnest, 22'9 U.S. 114, 122, 57 L. ed. 1096, 
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1101, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. G3±) ,-nevertheless, under 
the tern1s of a proviso to the section, contributory 
negligence on the part of the employee does not 
operate even to diminish the recovery where the 
injury has been occasioned in part by the failure 
of the carrier to comply with the exactions of an 
act of Congress enacted to promote the safety of 
employees. In that contingency the statute abol-
ishes the defense of contributory negligence, not 
only as a bar to recovery, but for all purposes.'' 
The Lindsay case, of course, was authority for the 
later decision of the Sup·reme Court of the United States 
in Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad Co. v. C·ampbell, 
241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125. The Campbell 
case concerned a railroad engineer who took his train 
out onto a single track line at a time when a regular train 
was approaching on the same track. After proceeding 
some little distance he observed the regular train com-
ing toward him. He applied the brakes, they failed to 
work and a collision resulted. At the trial a jury speci-
fically found that Campbell had disobeyed a direct order 
to him. They also rendered a general verdict on his be-
half finding that the defective brakes were the p~roximate 
cause of the collision an·d injury to Campbell. 
·The railroad in the ·Campbell case argued that the 
disobedience of orders on the part of Campbell took 
him outside the class of employees for whose protection 
the Safety Appliance Act was passed and that because 
of his disobedience he departed from the course of his 
employment. The court, in affirming the general ver-
dict for Campbell, set forth in the following language 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
the basic principles governing his conduct in relation 
to the railroad company's violation of the Safety Ap-
pliance Act : 
''Upon the whole case, we have no difficulty 
in sustaining his right of action under the em-
ployers' liability act. That act (Sec. 1, 35 Stat. 
at L. 65, chap. 149, Cornp. Stat. 1913, Sec. 8657) 
imposes a liability for injury to an employee 
'resulting in whole or in part from the negligence 
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of 
such carrier, or by reason of any defect or in-
sufficiency due to its negligence in its cars, en-
gines, appliances, . . . . or other equi prnent.' As 
was held in San Antonio & A. Pass. R. Co. v. 
Wagner, decided June 5, 1916, 241 U.S. 476, 60 
L. ed. --------, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep·. 62·6, a violation of 
the safety appliance act is 'negligence' within the 
meaning of the liability act. And by the proviso 
to Sec. 3 of the latter act, no employee injured 
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence in any case where a violation 
of the ·safety appliance act 'contributed to the 
injury or death of such employee.' It is too plain 
for argument that under this legislation the vio-
lation of the safety appliance act need not be the 
sole efficient cause, in order that an action may 
lie. The circuit court of appeals (133 C.C.A. 
370, 217 Fed. 524) held that the element of 
proximate cause is eliminated where concurring 
acts of the employer and ·employee contribute to 
the injury or death of the employee. We agree 
with this, except that we find it unnecessary to 
say the effect of the ·statute is wholly to eliminate 
the question of proximate cause. But where, as 
in thi.s case, plaintiff's contributory negligence 
and defendant's violation of a provision of the 
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safety appliance act are concurring proximate 
causes, it is plain that the employers' liability 
act requires the former to be disregarded.'' 
Justice l\IcReynolds, following the same line of 
thought and authority in Chicago Gre>at Western R. ·Co. 
v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 45 is. Ct. 303, 304, 69 L. Ed. 
614, reached a similar result dealing with the following 
facts quoted from his decision : 
"While the freight train upon which Ring 
served as brakeman was upon the main line at 
Budd, Iowa, a drawbar pulled out of a car. There-
upon the crew chained this car to the one imme-
diately ahead. The engine pulled the whole train 
onto the adjacent siding, which lies on a gentle' 
grade, and stop·ped. The intention was to de-
tach the damaged car and leave it there. The plan 
was to cut off the engine, bring it around back 
of the train, remove the rear portion, couple this 
to the forward portion and move on. Acting 
under the conductor'a direction, Ring asked the 
head brakeman to tell the engineer to proceed, 
and then, without the knowledge of either of the 
others, he and the conductor went between the 
crippled car and the next one in order to disen-
gage the connecting chain. While they were work-
ing there the engineer cut off the engine, the car 
ran slowly down the grade, and Ring, caught by 
the chain, suffered fa tal injuries. 
''A rule of the company provided that em-
ployees slJ.ould advise the engineer when they 
were going between or under cars and must know 
that he understood their purpose before they put 
themselves in any dangerous ·position. Ring gave 
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no such warning, although familiar with the rule 
and with the grade upon which the train stood. 
"Petitioner insists: (1) The facts do not 
bring the case within the :safety Appliance Act 
since the car had come to rest on the side track 
and had ceased to be 'used,' within the meaning 
of the statute. (2) The defective drawbar did 
not .proximately contribute to the injury. ( 3) The 
violation of the rule by Ring constituted negli-
gence subsequent to and independent of the ques-
tion of a defective safety appliance and was 
a proximate cause of the injury.'' 
In discussing the effect of the violation of a Safety 
Rule by Ring the Justice uses the following language: 
''The things shown to have been done by the 
deceased certainly amount to no more than con-
tributory negJigence or assumption of the risk, 
and both of these are removed from consideration 
by the Liability Act. When injured he was 'with-
in the class of persons for whose benefit the Safety 
Appliance Acts required that the car be equipped 
with automatic couplers and drawbars of stand-
ard height. * * * His injury was within the evil 
against which the provisions for such appliances 
are directed.' St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. 
Co. v. Cona·rty, supra. He went into the danger-
ous place because the equipment of the car which 
it was necessary to detach did not meet the 
statutory requirements especially intended to pro-
tect men in his position. 
''We find no material error in the judgment 
below, and it is 
' 'Affirmed. ' ' 
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The derisions of the Supreme Court cited and quoted 
fron1 herein have been construed and used by the var-
ious circuit courts in a variety of railroad accident 
cases. 
Sc·rinz o v. Central R. R. of New Jersey et al., 138 
F. (2d) 761, 762, concerned a safety rule promulgated 
b:"'" the railroad company which prohibited employees 
from going between cars where the coupling device was 
defective. The evidence indicated that the deceased, 
Murray,· had entered in between two moving cars while 
attempting to use a defective cutting lever which was a 
part of a coupling mechanism. The jury returned a ver-
dict for the plaintiff and the railroad company cited as 
error an instruction of the court to disregard the safety 
rule. The circuit court in ·dealing with this action on the 
part of the trial court stated: 
''The defendants put in evidence their Safety 
Rule 203 of which Murray had a copy. This reads 
as follows: 'Rule 203. In coupling or uncoupling 
cars the cutting levers must be used. If cutting 
lever or coupling device is inoperative, cars, loco-
motives or motors must be stopped, and slack per-
mitted to run in or out before any attemp~t is 
made to adjust coupling device.' 
''The court charged that violation of the 
safety rules was not an issue in the case and they 
were not to be considered by the jury. Counsel 
for the defendants took an exception and asked 
the court 'in furtherance of that situation to 
charge the jury that if the jury were to find that 
the violation of those rules which are in evidence 
was the proximate -cause of the decedent's death, 
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then their verdict "\vould be f'Or the defendants.' 
This request was properly denied since contrib-
utory negligence or assumption of risk are no 
defense if a violation of the Safety Appliance .Act 
contributes to the injury or death. 45 U.S.C . .A. 
Sees. 53, 54; Chicago, G. W. R. Co. v. Schendel, 
267 U.S. 287, 292, 45 S. Ct. 303, 69 L. Ed. 614. '' 
Palum v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 165 F. (2d) 3, 6, 
a decision written by Augustus N. Hand, deals with the 
failure on the part of a railroad employee to keep, a 
lookout in the direction in which his train was moving, 
and also a failure on the part of the emp·loyee to obey 
an unwritten safety rule which required a fireman to 
notify the engineer before leaving the cab while the train 
was in motion. The argument by the railroad comp·any 
was that plaintiff's disobedience of the rule and his fail-
ure to observe the low bridge in time to prevent being 
hit by it was the ·sole cause of his injury. Justice Hand 
in his opinion stated as follows: 
"=t * * What the plaintiff seems to have 
done wa.s to have failed to be watchful enough 
for obstacles as well as to have forgotten to notify 
the engineer that he was going to leave the cab. 
We think the inadvertent neglect to observe the 
rule, while probably an act of contributory neg-
ligence to be considered by the jury in reduction 
of his damages, was not a bar to his claim.'' 
Philadelphia & R. Ry. ·Co. v . .Auc·he:nbaah, 16 F. (2d) 
550, 551, concerned an accident wherein a brakeman was 
crushed between two cars after attempting to effect 
a coupling when the automatic coupler did not work 
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on impact. The railroad company offered to prove that 
one of its rules had been disobeyed by the plaintiff in 
that he had failed to leave his lantern outside on the 
.e:Tound where it would be in view of the members of his 
crew while he went between the cars, and that this 
failure on his part was the proximate and sole cause 
of plaintiff's injury. The trial court then instructed 
the jury that .if they found there was a violation of the 
Safety Appliance Act liability would attach to the de-
fendant without regard to the negligence on the part 
of plaintiff. The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, in 
affirming the trial court's ruling, stated: 
"The plaintiff in the instant case went be-
tween the cars to p·repare for another attempt 
to couple only becaus·e the couplers did not at first 
couple automatically by impact, that is, 'Because 
the equipment of the car which it was necessary 
to (couple) did not meet the statutory require-
ments especially intended to protect him in his 
position.' Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. :Schendel, 
supra; Tennesse A. & G. R. R. Co. v. Drake (C. 
C. A.) 276 F. 393. If his act amounted to negli-
gence it was no more than contributory negli-
gence which was removed from consideration by 
the Act. Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, 
supra; Auchenbach v. P. & R. R. Co., supra. More-
over, it is the law that a violation of the Act need 
not be the sole efficient cause in order that an 
action may lie. ·so also the element of proximate 
cause is eliminated where concurrent acts of the 
employer and employee ·contribute to the injury. 
S·pokane & Island E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 
497, 510, 36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125; Pless v. 
New York Central R. R. Co., 189 App. Div. 261, 
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179 N.Y.S. 578, Affir1ned, 232 N.Y. 523, 134 N.E. 
555. In this situation, where there was nothing to 
show that the plaintiff's contributory negligence, 
if any, was other than negligence concurrent with 
that of the defendant, it follows that an issue of 
the plaintiff's contributory negligence with its 
underlying issue of proximate cause was elimi-
nated from the case and, in consequence, evidence 
to prove it was properly rejected. Southern R. 
R. Co. v. Crockett, 234 U.S. 72·5, 34 S. Ct. 897, 
58 L. Ed. 1564; Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Otos, 
239 u.s. 349, 36 ~s .. ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322; T. & P. 
R. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36· S. Ct. 482, 
60 L. Ed. 874; Atlantic City R .. R .. Co. v. Parker, 
242 U.S. 56, 37 S. Ct. 69, 61 L. Ed. 150; Union 
Pacific R .. R. Co. v. Huxoll, 245 U.S. 535, 38 S. 
Ct. 187, 62 L. Ed. 455. '' 
The most recent circuit court decision in point here 
is McCa.rthy v. Pe.nnsylvania R. Co., 156 F. (2d) 877, 
881, ( cert. den. 329 u.~s .. 812, 6·7 S. Ct. 635, 91 L. Ed. 69'3), 
wherein Judge Minton, President Truman's nominee to 
the Sup:reme Court of the United States, authored the 
court's opinion. McCarthy, the engineer, operated his 
engine from Indiana Harbor, Indiana, into Chicago, Ill., 
after knowing that the locomotive had developed a hot 
box. At Whiting, Indiana the conductor gave McCarthy 
a signal to go to the next station at Colehour, about 
one mile away, and get another engine. McCarthy ig-
nored this ·signal. Several other employees. between 
Whiting and Chicago gave McCarthy a hot bo~ signal. 
At Englewood the conductor again talked to McCarthy 
and suggested that he get another engine at defendant's 
shop at 59th Street in Chicago, but McCarthy refused 
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and continued toward the Union Station in Chicago . 
. A.t 22nd Street another hot box signal was given Mc-
Carthy, which he ignored, and after traveling a short 
distance the pony truck on the locomotive broke, the 
engine turned over and McCarthy was killed. In dis-
cussing the case Judge Minton stated: 
''The defendant's answer tendered the issue 
that the sole proximate cause ·of the accident wa.s 
the fact that the decedent continued to use the 
locomotive after he knew of its defective condition 
and failed to report it as was his duty under the 
rules. These acts constituted no defense. ·The 
decedent's acts were all concurring acts with the 
act of the defendant in violation of the statute, 
and were either acts of contributory negligence or 
assumption of the risk of known danger, from 
both of which, as we have pointed out, the dece-
dent had been relieved by the statute. '* * * But 
where, as in this case, plaintiff's contributory 
negligence and defendant's violation of a provi-
sion of the saf·ety appliance act are concurring 
proximate causes, it is plain that the employers' 
liability act requires the former to be disre-
garded.' Spokane & Inland Empire R. Co. v. 
Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 510, H6 S. Ct. 683, 689, 
60 L. Ed. 1125. ~s.ee also Louisville & Nashville 
Co. v. Wene, 7 Cir., 202 F. 887, 892. 
''The court further instructed the jury: 'On 
the other hand, (if you find) that the railroad 
company, knew at all times the things required 
of it by law, and that it did not violate the law 
requiring the use of engines in safe condition, 
even if you find the Defendant was negligent and 
did not comply with the law requiring the use of 
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engines in good condition, but that such failure to 
comply with the law was not the cause of the 
injury to and death of the decedent, but that such 
injury and death were caused solely by his own 
acts independently of any negligence on the part 
of the Defendant, it would be your duty to find 
for the Defendant. But, as I have stated, such 
acts of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, 
if you find such acts of negligence, merely con-
tributed to and were not the sole cause of his 
death, you should find for the Plaintiff.' 
"This instruction is improper, first because it 
told the jury in effect that the defendant's lia-
bility for violation of the statute depended upon 
the said violation being the cause of the dece-
dent's death, whereas the statute provides that 
the defendant shall be liable if the violation 
caused 'in whole or in part' th·e death of the de-
cedent. 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51; Spokane & Inland 
Empire R. Co. v. Campbell, supra. Secondly, 
the instruction is imp·rop,er because it told the 
jury that the plaintiff could not recove.r if his 
decedent was guilty of acts of negligence that 
solely caused his. death. As an abstract proposi-
tion of law, that is correct, hut there was no evi-
dence of any independent acts of negligence by 
the decedent that were the sole cause of the acci-
·dent and his death. The court had instructed on 
a proposition of law about which there was no 
evidence. 
''This was bound to confuse and mislead the 
jury into believing that the concurring acts of 
the decedent in continuing to use the defective 
locomotive after he knew it was defective, and 
not reporting it, might be considered as acts of 
negligence, for which the decedent might be 
charged with sole liability for the accident. The 
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giving of such instruction under such circum-
stances "'"as error. Insurance Co. v. Baring, 20 
Wall. 159, 87 U.S. 159, 162, 22 L. Ed. 225; United 
States v. Breitling, 20 How. 252, 61 U.S. 252, 254, 
15 L. Ed. 900; Adan1s v. Vanderbeck, 148 Ind. 
92 .. 97, 45 N.E. 645, 47 N,.E. 24, 62 Am. St. Re-p. 
497; Fletcher Bros. Co. v. Hyde, 36 Ind. App. 
96, 75 N.E. 9; 64 Corpus Juris, Sec. 657; 53 
American Juris prudence, Section 579-580, and 
numerous cases cited. 
''The judgment is reversed, and the District 
Court is directed to grant a new trial.'' 
The language which Judge Minton nsea in the Me 
Carthy case and his line of reasoning is es'pecially appli-
cable in the present situation. 
The court instructed the jury in Instruction No. 16, 
as follows ( J .R. 210) : 
'' * * • then William Frank Lucus, the de-
ceased, was guilty of negligence, and if such neg-
ligence, if you so find, was the sole proximate 
cause of deceased's injuries and death, then your 
verdict must be for the defendant 'no cause of 
action.' '' 
There is, of course, no evidence of any indepen·dent 
act of negligence by the decedent, William Frank Lucus, 
and if the instruction in the M cOarthy case concerning 
sole cause was an abstract proposition of law about 
which there was no evidence, then, of course, the court's 
instruction in the present case is also an abstract propo-
sition of law about which there is no evidence. Neither 
the Utah State Supreme Court nor the United States 
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Supreme Court in the two decisions which have been 
written conceived or discussed the actions of Lucus as 
being independent intervening acts. 
It seems obvious that Instruction No. 16 was bound 
to confuse and mislead the jury into believing that 
the acts of negligence on the part of decedent could be 
the sole cause of his death. 
The United States 'Supreme Court in its decision in 
the case at bar pointed out that this court discussed 
the causes of the death of Lucus by resort to dilectical 
subleties distinguishing between what was a philoso-
phical cause and a legal cause. The decision then stated: 
''The language selected by Congress to fix 
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. 
Consideration of its meaning by the introduction 
of dialectical subleties can serve no useful inter-
pretative purpose. The statute declares that rail-
roads shall be responsible for their employees' 
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from defec-
tiv-e appliances such as· were here maintained. 
45 U.S.C. 51. And to make its purpose crystal 
clear, Congress has also p-rovided that 'no such 
employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence in any case' where a 
violation of the 'Safety Appliance Act, such as 
the one here, 'contributed to the . . . death of 
such employee.' 45 U.S.C. 53. Congress has thus 
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety 
obligations upon railroads and has commanded 
that if a breach of these obligations con tributes 
in part to an employee's death, the railroad must 
pay damages. These air-brakes we're defective; 
for this reason alone the train suddenly and un-
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expectedly stopped; a motor track car following 
at about the same rate of speed and ·operated by 
an employee looking in another direction crashed 
into the train; all of these circumstances were 
inseparably related to one another in time and 
space. The jury could have found that decedent's 
death resulted from any or all of the foregoing 
circumstances.'' 
Using the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cision as a foundation, p;laintiff in his requested Instruc-
tion No-. 4 requested that the court instruct the jury 
as follows ( J.R. 208): 
''You are instructed that under the provisions 
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act if a violation 
of such act by a common carrier by rail in inter-
state commerce contributes to the death of one 
its employees th·en such employee cannot be held 
to have been guilty of contributory negligence. 
''In this connection if you find from a pre-
ponderance of· the evidence that the violation of 
the Federal Safety Appliance Act mentioned in 
Instruction No. ________ (here insert number which 
corresponds to plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
No. 3) contributed to the death of William Frank 
Lucus then you are instructed that the s-aid Wil-
liam Frank Lucus cannot be found or considered 
guilty of contributory negligence, and you must, 
in arriving at your verdict, entirely disregar:d 
the manner in which he drove and operated the 
motorcar regardless of whether or not the manner 
in which he drove or operated constitutedafailure 
on his part to exercise ordinary care, and your 
verdict should be for plaintiff even though his 
conduct contributed to cause his own death.'' 
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The first paragraph only of this request was given. 
This Court will, of course, notice that the Supreme 
Court of the United States does not use the words 
''proximate cause'' but state a, as did Instruction No. 
4, that "where a violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act, such as the one here, 'contributed to the death 
of such employee.' '' Could there be any possible doubt 
that the unexpected, sudden stop of the freight train 
contributed to cau.se Lucus' death~ 
Can the immovable object be casually eliminated 
from the explosion resulting from a meeting with the 
irresistable force? 
The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court be-
came the law of this case. The trial court's ·refusal 
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 4 was a 
direct disregard of that opinion depriving plaintiff of 
the rights which the Supreme Court declared were due 
him and prejudicially depriving him of his rights under 
the Safety Appliance and Federal Employers' Liability 
Acts. 
The state authorities construing and following the 
Supreme Court of the United 'States and other federal 
cases are numerous. The factual ·situations, of course, 
are varied in many ways. We cite and discuss only a 
few of the more pertinent cases. 
In Leet v. Union Bacifiic R. Co., 60 Cal. App. (2d). 
814, 142 P. (2d) 37, 40, the plaintiff brought an action for 
wrongful death basing her suit upon a violation by the 
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defendant of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, re-
quiring all cars used in interstate commerce to be 
equipped with efficient hand brakes. The defendant 
sought to introduce a rule which was excluded by the 
trial court. Mter referring to Tiller v. AtZarntic Coast 
Li:ne R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 143 A.L.R. 
967, the court stated: 
'' Since the negligence of the defendant in 
sending out a car with its brake rigging in a defec .. 
tive condition was concededly established, it fol .. 
lows that defendant may not be relieved from the 
consequences of its neglect by the claim that plain-
tiff assumed the risk of such negligence. 
"Rule 26, which was excluded from the evi-
dence reads· as follows: 'When emergency repair 
work is to be done under or about the cars in a 
train and a blue signal is not available, the ·en-
gineman and fireman must be notified and pro-
. tection must be given those engaged in making the 
repairs.' 
''In view of the amendment to section 54 and 
of the Tiller decision rule 26 was immaterial to 
the issues and was properly rejected. Chicago, 
etc., Co. v. Schendel, supra. If there was no 
assumed risk or contributory negligence to be at-
tributed to the brakeman, no amount of rules 
adopted by defendant could alter the law if the 
company was itself negligent.'' . 
In Aly v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo. 
1116, 119 S.W. (2d) 863 (1938), action was brought for 
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff. Plaintiff's suit 
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was based on a violation of the Federal Boiler Inspec-
tion Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 22, one of the acts en-
acted by Congress to promote the ·.safety of railroad em-
ployees. Plaintiff had sought to mount a moving engine 
and in stepping on a footboard, it gave way causing 
him to fall and lose both legs. The engine was coming 
toward him at the time he attempted to mount it. The 
defendant sought to introduce a rule of the company 
forbidding switchmen to board engines coming toward 
them. The trial court's refusal to admit the rule was. 
upheld by the Appellate Court, and in discu.s·.sing the 
matter, the court stated: 
"A'ppellant offered to introduce in evidence 
a rule of the company which forbade switchmen 
to board engines coming toward them. The trial 
court refused to permit this rule to be introduced 
in evidence. Appellant has cited the case of 
Frese v. Chicago, B. & 0·. R. Co., 26·3 U. S. 1, 44 
S. Ct. 1, 58 L. Ed. 131. In that case a statute- of 
Illinois made it the duty of a locomotive engineer 
to stop his train at a c.rossing of another railroad 
and to positively ascertain that the way was clear 
before passing over the crossing. This the engi-
neer failed to do and lost his life in a collision 
which followed. The court held that a violation of 
the statutory duty on the part of the engineer 
was the sole cause of the injury. Without 'de-
ciding whether a violation of a rule of the com-
pany is a parity with a violation of a state statute, 
there is on this distinction : In the Frese Case 
the plaintiff relied upon the negligence of the 
fireman in failing to perform a duty which the 
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statute imposed upon the engineer. In the case 
before us plaintiff 'vas relying upon a defective 
appliance. So even if plaintiff violated a rule, 
that would be only a contributing cause and not 
the sole cause. In Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. 
Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, ·60 L·. Ed. 
1125, the plaintiff had violated an order, and was 
injured through a defective air hose which caused 
a collision. In 241 U.S. 497, loc, cit. 508, 36 is .. Ct. 
689, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the Court said in speaking 
of the violation of the order: 'In its legal effect 
this was nothing more than negligence on his 
part.' The court further said in the concluding 
part of the opinion : 'But where, as in this case, 
plaintiff's contributory negligence and defen-
dant'B violation of a provision of the safety ap-
pliance act are concurring proximate causes, it 
is plain that the employers' liability act requires 
the former to be disregarded.' In the case under 
consideration the jury was explicitly instructed 
that plaintiff could not recover unless the foot-
board slip·ped toward the drawbar and caused the 
plaintiff to fall. A violation of the rule, there-
fore, could at most have been only contributory 
negligence and not a defense. We must rule the 
point against appellant." 
In Jordan v. E~as:t St. Louis Co111necting Ry. Q;o., 
308 Mo. 31, 271 S.W. 997, the plaintiff brought suit under 
the F·ederal Employers' Liability Act and based the 
action upon a violation of the Federal'S.afety Appliance 
Act relating to automatic couplers. Plaintiff kicked the 
drawbar in order to align it for coupling, and his 
foot was crushed by the impact of the couplers. De-
fendant attempted to introduce in evidence a rule of 
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the defendant company prohibiting employees from kick-
ing draw bars. The court stated: 
''The next error assigned is the refusal of the 
court to permit defendant to show that a rule 
had been promulgated forbidding employees to 
kick drawbars, and to show that the plaintiff had 
knowledge of the existence of that rule. Upon 
that Schendel v. C. M. & St. P. R. R. Co. (Minn.), 
197 N. W. 744, and Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen., 
65 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, are cited. But it was 
held otherwise in Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I. 
Ry., 268 Mo. 31, 186 S. W. 1035. In that case, one 
under the Safety Appliance Act, the question 
came up upon a rule forbidding employees 'to 
go between cars in motion to uncouple them.' 
Following references to the circumstances under 
which the question arose, the court ;said, loc, cit. 
35 (186 s.w. 1037): 
" 'Further, respondent's violation, if any of 
appellant's rule was at most but evidence of con-
tributory negligence; and in this case, the action 
being founded upon violations of the applicable 
Safety Appliance Act, contributory negligence 
constitutes neither defense nor mitigation. (Sec-
ond Employers' Liability Cases, 223, U.S. 1. c. 
49, 50). There was no error in this ruling.' 
'' 'In the first case cited by defendant, Schen-
del v. Chicago, M. & St.· P. Ry. Co., the question 
at issue was one of 'exact obedience f~om an em-
ployee to a. foreman's direct command requiring 
instant execution.' It was held that if the em-
ployee directly contrary to such command med· 
died with. a defective appliance, his willful dis-
obedience must be regarded as the sole cause of 
his injury. But the court distinguished between a 
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command of that sort and the issuance of general 
standing orders or rules; the rule on the latter 
being that of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U.S. 
349, 36 S. Ct. 124, 60 L. Ed. 322. This assignment 
must be ruled against defendant.'' 
In Ross v. New York ·C. & St. L. R. Co., 73 F. (2d) 
187, 188, ( 1934, 6th Circuit), plaintiff claimed the right to 
recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
and the Boiler Inspection Act. The court charged the 
jury that there was no liability under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, but submitted the case upon 
the Boiler Inspection Act. There was· a verdict for de-
fendant and plaintiff ap·pealed. 'The chief error relie·d 
upon was the admission over plaintiff's objection of 
a company safety rule in evidence. The court stated: 
''The petition charged violation of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, and under that 
enactment, section 53, title 45, U.S.C. ( 45 U.S. 
C.A., Section 53), testimony hearing upon the 
contributory negligence of the defendant is ad-
missible in diminution of damages except where 
the common carrier has violated any statute en-
acted for the safety of employees, thus contri-
buting in whole or in part to the injury or death 
of such employee. Kansas City Southern R. Co. 
v. Jones, Adm'x, 241 U.'S:. 181, 36 S. Ct. 513, 
60 L. Ed. 943. 
''The testimony as to the existence, promul-
gation and violation of the rule was admissible 
at the time it was received, for no violation of a 
safety act had been shown and the case was still 
being heard under the Federal Employers' Lia-
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bility Act. When the court charged the jury that 
no liability was imposed upon the defendant be-
cause of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
counsel for plaintiff should then have requested 
that all testimony as to the existence, promul-
gation, and violation of the rule he excluded from 
the record and that the jury be instructed to dia ... 
regard it. No such request was made.'' 
In Alab,am,a Great Sou,ther.n R. Co. v. Cornett, (Ala.) 
106 So. 242, the plaintiff attempted to uncouple two cars, 
but because of the defective condition of the couplers, 
he failed and fell underneath the wheels. The defend-
ant contended that there was no direct evidence as to the 
cause of the injuries to the deceased beyond the undis-
puted · fact that he was run over by one of the cars. 
Defendant contended that plaintiff had failed to dis-
charge the burden of the p·roof that the violation, if any, 
of the Safety Appliance Act, proximately caused the 
injuries. The court stated: 
"Under the federal statutes entering into the 
decision of this case, any misconduct of said in-
testate, being n9 more than contributory negli-
gence, is. excluded as a defense in bar to a re-
covery by the terms of the Employers' Liability 
Act ( 35 Stat. 66 (U.iS.. Comp. St. Sections 8657-
8665) vol. 2, Roberts Fed. Liab. of Carriers, P. 
· 1406, Section 863-868), and by those of the Safety 
Appliance provisions, 27 Stat. 532 (U.S. Comp. 
St. Section 8612:); Barnes' Fed. Code (1919), p·p. 
1929, 1937, Section 8030, 8071; Roberts Fed. Liab. 
of Carriers, p. 773, et seq. ; Ala. & V. R. Co. v. 
Dennis, 128 Miss. 298, 91 So. 4. Pertinent obser-
vations of Mr. 'Justice Pitney are contained in San 
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Antonio, etc., Co. v. ''Tagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36 
S. Ct. 626, 60 L. Ed. 1110, 1117. 
'·The common-law duty of due care is 
changed to that of an absolute duty in resp·ects 
indicated by Congress. A failure of a coupler 
to "'"ork at any time 'vhen required or necessary 
held to sustain a charge of negligence or failure 
of statutory duty in the premises (Chicago, etc., 
Co. v. Brown, 229 U.S. 317, 33 S. Ct. 840, 57 L. 
Ed. 1204; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 
220 U.S. 559, 31 S. Ct. 612, 55 L. Ed. 582; St. 
L., etc., Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616, 
52 L. Ed. 1061); that is to say, this prescribed and 
required safety appliance must not only he pro-
vided, but duly maintained in condition for opera-
tion (L. & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 37 
S. Ct. 456, 61 L. Ed. 931). When the statute is 
so understood, the conduct of plaintiff's intestate 
was immaterial, though in contravention to posi-
tive rules or instructions by defendant. Noel v. 
Q. 0. & K. C. R. Co. (Mo. App.) 182 S. W. 787. 
There was no error in the court's rulings and 
refusal of charges as to the rules of defendant as 
affecting intestate's conduct in disregard of said 
rules and defendant'·s liability for injury inflicted 
while so disregarding the rules. Texas & P. R. 
Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S .. 33, 39, 36 S. Ct. 482, 60 
L. Ed. 874,877. '' 
In the case of Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. D'Av·ig-
non (Ga.), 153 S. 'E. 96',; the court held that in a ·suit ·~bY, 
an employee for personal injury based upon an alleged 
violation of the Safety Appliance Act, the only defense 
that an interstate carrier can make is that proper ap-
pliances were provided and maintained in good condi-
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tion, or that the defective ap'pliance was not a contribu-
tory cause of the injury of the employee. 
In the ca.se of Potter v. Los Angeles & 8. L. R. Q,o., 
42 Nev. 370, 177 Pac. 933, 934, the court granted plain-
tiff's motion to strike the defendant's defense of contri-
butory negligence, the plaintiff having based his claim 
upon an alleged violation hy defendant of the Safety 
Appliance Act. The court stated: 
"* * * It . is clear from the complaint that 
plaintiff, as a basis of recovery, relies upon the 
negligence of the appellant in having a defective 
automatic coupler upon the car which was being 
switched. The allegation as to the sp·eed of the 
car was, we take it, for the· pur'pose of showing 
the necessity for plaintiff's jumping from a car 
aft~er it had become uncoupled, and was not 
pleaded as a cause of action. Conceding, for the 
purpose of the case, that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence in jumping from the 
car, it was only one of the concurring causes of 
plaintiff's injury for the proximate cause was 
the defective coupler, but for the defective 
coupler, the cars would have· been under P'er-
fect eontrol, they would not have run at an 
excessive rate of speed, and there would have 
been no injury. We think the language .of the 
court in Otos v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 
283, 150 N.W. 9~2, is squarely in point. The court 
said: 
'' 'Defendant contends that the proximate 
caus·e of plaintiff's injury was, not the defective 
condition of the coupling, but his violation of a 
rule of the employer forbidding employees going 
between moving cars. It appears that there was 
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such a rule. There is evidence that in this yard 
it had, with the knowledge of the yardmaster, 
been more honored in its breach than in its ob-
servance. But, 'vhatever may be said of the pro-
priety of plaintiff's act in going between the cars, 
it was only one of the concurring causes of plain-
tiff's injury. The violation of the statute was one 
cause of his injury. Turrittin v. Chicago, St. P., 
~f. & 0. Ry. Co., 95 Minn. 408, 104 N.W. 225; 
Sprague v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., 104 Minn. 
58, 116 N.W. 104. This is all that is necessary to 
create liability. The statute which abolishes con-
tributory negligence '' 'would be nullified by call-
ing plaintiff's act the proximate cause, and then 
defeating him, when he could not be defeated by 
calling his act contributory negligence. * * • It 
is only when plaintiff's act is the sole cause-
when defendant's act is no part of the causation 
-that defendant is free from liability under the 
act.''' Grand ·Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. Lind-
say, 233 U.S. 42, 47, 34 Sup. Ct. 581, 582, 58 L. 
Ed. 838, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 168, quoting 201 Fed. 
844, 120 C.C.A. 166.' '' 
Instruction No. 16 also contains what plaintiff 
conceives to be a misconception of the evidence in that 
the instruction states_ that Frank Lucus was in a posi-
tion on the motorcar with his back toward the freight 
trai:rrilllrl posing a hypothetical question for the jury to 
consider as to whether or not Frank Lucus could have 
manipulated the track car as well without his back being 
toward the freight train. There .is abBolutely no evi-
dence in the record that Mr. Lucus. was in a position on 
the motor car where his b~ck was toward the freight 
train. Mr. Lynch testified that the track car was pro-
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ceeding in an easterly direction; that he was seated on 
the south side, facing south, and that Mr. Lucus was 
·seated on the north ·side, facing north (Tr. -19, 29). 
The evidence was clear that both Lucus and Lynch were 
looking to the west, but they were both seated on the 
car in the normal and usual manner, i.e., they were 
seated with their feet off the edge of the platform and 
on a railing constructed around the outer edge of the 
track car for the purpose of supporting the workmen's 
feet. 'There is no evidence in the record any place that 
the position of Frank Lucus on the motor car was an 
unsafe or dangerous position. 
It is obvious, of course, that the failure of Frank 
Lucus to observe the stalled freight train some time 
prior to the time the track car came into collision with 
its rear was a contributing cause to his death, but it is 
inconceivable that anyone could believe that the stalled 
freight train was not also a contributing cause to the 
death of Frank Lucus. The court refused plaintiff's 
1 equested Instruction No. 4 which set forth in clear and 
concise language this principle. Instead he instructed 
in legal language which was well calculated to mislead 
the jury into believing that under these circumstances 
there was a sole proximate cause of the death of William 
Frank Lucus. 
We again call the Court's attention to the M C'C artlvy 
v. Pennsylvarn.ia R. Co., case, supra, and the decision of 
the United State;s. Supreme Court in this case with full 
assurance that this Court applying the standards set 
down in those two cases can arrive at but one conclusion: 
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That the trial court, in refusing plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. -!, in allowing the introduction of Exhibit 
'· 3'' and in giving Instruction No. 16, all and each of 
w·hich errors deprived plaintiff of his righto unde·r the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. 
We submit that the language and thought set forth 
and contained in the opinion of Justice Black, written 
for a unanimous court, is as crystal clear as he, declares 
the statute to be. That court has stated for the guidance 
and direction of this court and the trial court in this 
caoe that the issues presented by the pleading and proof, 
concern two matters, and two matters only: (1) was th~e 
defendant guilty as it is admitted it was of a violation 
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, and (2) did that 
violation contribute in whole or in part to the death of 
deceased. 
The trial court by its rulings in this caoe has either 
intentionally disregarded the mandate of the Supreme 
Court or has been incapable and unable to interpret and 
apply the express direction. In either event the trial 
court was guilty of groB.s and prejudicial error. 
Edith B. Lucus, the widow of this deceased, is en-
titled to a fair trial of her cause under the law, and the 
guiding interpretive decision of the Supreme Court of 
the United States should make that law so clear and so 
easy of understanding that any trial court in the State 
of Utah could understand and be guided by it. It is 
true that a jury might well find that Mrs. Lucus hao not 
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been as greatly damaged in the loss of her husband as 
other widows whose matters have been brought to the 
attention of this court, but that is of no moment here 
in this case. Her rights. are just as great and juat as 
sacred as though her husband had been constant and 
faithful in his devotion to his family and she had been 
the mother of numerous dependent children. 
The Judge who tried this case has been clearly 
informed and advised by the Supreme Court of the 
United Statea, if such advice is necessary in view of the 
"crystal clear" language of the act that contributory 
negligence was not an issue in this case, but for the 
benefit of the litigants here the trial judge has written 
some new law and has not only made contributory neg-
ligence a partial, but a complete defense to this action. 
Such apparent disregard of the law deserves the rebuke 
of this court and should not he tolerated. 
The recorda in this case will show that plaintiff ex-
hausted his remedy to escape from the necessity of 
trying this case before the Honorable John A. Hendricks, 
and we pause at this time to call the court's, attention to 
the contention we made at that time that it would be 
impossible for Mrs. Lucus to obtain a fair and impartial 
trial before Judge Hendricks, and we assert here now 
that the record in this case shows that plaintiff was 
entirely correct in that contention and that she not only 
failed to receive a fair and impartial trial hut the law 
of the case, as declared by the 'Supreme Court of the 
United States, was entirely disregarded and the matter 
tried and submitted to the jury without any attention 
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paid to the Supreme Court of the United States, and on 
issues 'vhich were not only eliminated by the Federal 
Congress but were declared to be non-exisist'ent as mat-
ter of defense by the Supreme Court of the United 
State B. 
The only determination that counsel for the plaintiff 
has ever had in this matter is· to obtain for Edith B. 
Lucus a fair and impartial trial according to the law 
and the testimony in this case, and although that deter-
mination has been tried and vigorously tested, it still 
exists and will continue to exist until that end and aim 
is fully realized. 
We believe that a trial court's fir at duty is to apply 
the law as it exists, not as the trial court feels it should 
be, and we believe that when the Supreme Court of the 
United States has outlined the law in language that 
cannot be misunderstood by any intelligent consideration 
of it, that a trial court commits error when it completely 
and intentionally disregards the mandate of the Superior 
Court, an·d we submit to this court that the record in 
thia case establishes and supports these charges which 
we have made, and which we will continue to make until 
the doors of all courts in this country are closed against 
us. 
The contention of defendant that an 1ssue of sole 
proximate cause is made is pure and simple subterfuge 
and made for the purpose of breathing life into ·a de-
fense which haB· been expressly eliminated not only by 
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the Federal Congress but the Supreme Court of the 
United States in this ve·ry case. 
POINT II. 
THE OOURT'S REFUSAL AND F AlLURE TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AND IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY AS IT DID IN INSTRUCTION 
NO. 9 CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. (Assignment 
of Errors 4 and 5.) 
The evidence presented on the dependency and 
reasonable expectation of Mrs. Lucus for support from 
Frank Lucus demonstrated beyond any possible doubt 
that Frank Lucus did not at the time of his death intend 
to voluntarily support ~1rs. Lucus. Reference to de-
fendant's Exhibit "2" will demonstrate that Mrs. Lucus 
did not believe that she could voluntarily get support 
from Frank Lucus. However, Mrs. Lucus had an adjudi-
cation of her right to support from Frank Lucus and 
that adjudication by the California Court continued in 
force to the date of Frank Lucus' death. In light of this 
evidence plaintiff requested Instruction No. 11 a.s :fol-
lows (J.R. 208): 
''You are instructed that the marriage rela-
tion creates a right on the p·art of the wife to 
be supported by her husband and this right may 
be legally enforced by her so long as the marriage 
relation exists, and if the said Edith B. Lucus 
is entitled to recover damages under these in-
structions she cannot be deprived of that right 
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by a. plea on the part of defendant that her hus-
band had not fulfilled the duties he ow-ed to her. 
·'In thi:s connection you are instructed that 
if you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover 
dru.11ages in this case then in determining the loss 
of pecuniary benefits mentioned in Instruction 
No. ____________ (here insert the number of the Court's 
instruction which corresponds with 'plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 10). You may take 
into consideration not only such voluntary con-
tributions as William Frank Lucus may reason-
ably have been expected to make to Edith B. 
Lucus during her lifetime but also such contribu-
tions as she may reasonably have been expected 
to secure through the enforcement of her legal 
right to support from her husband.'' 
The request was refused and the court gave no 
instruction concerning the right of Edith Lucus to force 
Frank Lucus to suppoTt her. Instead he gave the fol-
lowing Instruction No. 9 ( J.R. 210) : 
''You are instructed that the mere fact that 
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus 
at the time of his death is not sufficient evidence 
to prove that the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
any damages for his death in this action. If you 
believe from all the evidence in the case that the 
deceased would not have made any further money 
contributions to Edith Lucua or would not have 
supported her in the future if he had not died, 
then your verdict should be for the defendant.'' 
This Court had a similar problem before it in Lle-
welyn v. lndtustrial Commission et ~al., 202 P. (2d) 160. 
, Chief Justice Pratt, in his opinion, clearly explains the 
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rights of a wife under a Utah se~parate maintenance 
decree. It is long established law in Utah that where 
there is no evidence on foreign law, that law will be 
presumed to be the same as the law of Utah. Smith v. 
Smith, 77 Utah 60,291 P. 2'98, at 300: 
''First. Was the decree entered in the divorce 
suit res adjudicata of the matter sought to be 
litigated in the suit at bar~ The evidence/ adduced 
at the trial clearly showed that, by reason of the 
divorce action, the North Dakota court had before 
it the question of the division of the p·roperty of 
the parties. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 3000, 
provides that, in actions for divorce, 'the court 
may make such order in relation to the children, 
property, parties, and the maintenance of the 
parties and children as shall be equitable. ' In 
the absence of a showing to the contrary, it is 
presumed that the law of North Dakota is to the 
same effect. Am. Oak Leather Co. v. Union Bank, 
9 Utah 87, 33 P. 246; Dickson v. Mullings, 66 
Utah 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R. 136. '' 
To the same effect see Shurtliff v. Oregon Sho!rt 
LineR. Co., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1.058; Grow v. 0. S. L. R. 
Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398. 
In the Llew~elyn case, supra, Chief Justice Pratt 
made the following statement concerning the right to 
involuntary support: 
"In the case of Utah Ap·ex Mining Co. v. 
Industrial Commission (66 ·Utah 529, 244 P. 658) 
cited above, this court discusses, inter alia, the 
·probability of the wife, in the future, obtaining 
support from the huohand either 'voluntarily or 
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involuntarily.' Obviously, in the p.resent case the 
support would not, in the future, have been vol-
untarily given; but certainly the chances of ac-
quiring involuntary support from the deceased 
would have met with little difficulty where the 
status of dependency has been adjudicated and 
the husband is capable of supporting his wife. 
There is a distinct and reasonable probability 
that the obligation of ·support under such a de-
cree would be satisfied by direction of the court. 
The separate maintenance decree is evidentiary 
of the fact that the wife is rightly living separate 
and apart from the husband through no fault 
of her own, but is entitled to support.'' 
The Supreme Court of the Unite·d States in a land-
malk case, Michiga;n Central R. Go. v. v.reeland, 227 
U. S. 59, 33 S. Ct. 192, 196, 57 L. Ed. 417, set forth the 
rule under Federal Employers' Liability Act cases as 
follows: 
''The distinguishing features of that act are 
identical with the act of Congress of 1908 before 
its amendment : First, it is grounded upon the 
original wrongful injury of the person; second, 
it is for the exclusive benefit of certain specified 
relatives ; third, the damages are such as flow 
from the dep-rivation of the pecuniary benefits 
which the beneficiaries. might have reasonably 
received if the deceaaed had not died from his 
injuries.'' 
New 0ff'leans & N. E. R. Co. v. Barris, 247 U.S. 
367, 38 S. Ct. 535, 536, 62 L. Ed. 1167, concerned a suit 
under the Act by deceased's mother. The widow who 
had lived with the deceased for only six months where-
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abouts was unknown. There was no indication that a 
divorce proceeding· had been commenced. The Supreme 
Court refused to allow the mother to participate as a 
dep·endent under the act, and stated as follows: 
''The act makes the widow ·sole beneficiary 
when there is no child and only in the absence 
of both may parents be considered. The deceased 
left a widow and although they had lived apart 
no claim is made that rights and liabilities con-
sequent upon marriage had disappeared under 
local law. Of course, we do not go beyond the 
particular facts here disclos,ed. In the circum-
stances, proof of the mothe'r '·s p·ecuniary loss 
could not support a recovery.'' 
'H.ee also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hollow~ay, 246 
U.S. 525, 38 S. Ct. 379, 62 L. Ed. 867. 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Miller, 267 F. 376, 381, (Cert. 
den. 254 U. 'S .. 646, 41 S. Ct. 15, 65 L. Ed. 455), concerned 
facts similar to those in the present case. The court 
made the following statement: 
''The court was asked to rule that only nom-
inal damages could be recovered, because Miller 
and his wife had separated ·soon after their mar-
riage, and he had not thereafter contributed to 
her support. But there had been no divorce, and 
nothing appears to show that she might not at 
any time have enforced he·r conjugal rights under 
the laws of Virginia. This being so, she was en-
titled to substantial damages, if the jury found 
in her favor, as seems to be ·plainly held by the 
Supreme Court in New Orlean-B. & N. E. R. Co. 
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Y. Harris, 2-± 7 U. S. 367, 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 535, 
G2 L. Ed. 1167. '' 
See also D~tnba·r v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. CiO'., 
186 F. 175. 
The state decisions holding that under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act a widow is entitled to have the 
jury consider the involuntary as well as the voluntary 
contributions which she might reasonably expect, are 
numerous and without conflict. 
In Foga.rty v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 85 Wash. 90, 
147 P. 652, 653, there was evidence tending to show 
that the deceas-ed railroad employee had abandoned his 
wife and child about five years before he was killed and 
since his abandonment had contributed practically noth-
ing to their support. The evidence ~so indicated that 
the widow had been searching for her husband since his 
abandonment. On these two facts the Foganty case is 
directly in point. The deceased in the Fogarty case also 
stated to persons that he had permanently ahand·oned 
his wife and he repudiated his paternity of the child 
which she had horne. Neither spouse had ever secured 
a divorce. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs and apportioned it between the widow and 
child. In discussing the case the court stated: 
"The appellant's argument is directed to 
two contentions: (1) That the undisputed evi-
dence shows that neither the widow nor the minor 
child had any reasonable expectation of ever re-
ceiving any assistance or support from the de-
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ceased; ·(2) that in any event the widow had 
forfeited all right to any assistance or support. 
"1. It is now thoroughly settled that the 
federal Employers' Liability Act in its essentials 
follows the first English law on the subject, that 
of 9 and 10 Victoria, known as Lord Campbell's 
act, and must be construed as that act has been 
-construed, not as a mere continuance of the right 
of the injured employe in favor of his estate, but 
a.s granting a new and independent cause of action 
for the benefit of the dependent relatives named 
in the statute, and that the damages recoverable 
are limited to the financial loss su·stained by their 
being deprived of a reasonable expectation of 
p·ecuniary benefit hy the wrongful death. Mich. 
Cent. R. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 33 :Sup. 
Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 176; 
American R. R. Co. of Porto Rico v. Didricksen, 
227 U. S. 145, 33 Sup. Ct. 224, 57 L. Ed. 456; 
Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 
U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426, 57 L. Ed. 785. 
"In its final analysis, the appellant's argu-
ment is reduced to the claim that in case of 
abandonment the jury should not he permitted 
to speculate upon the possibility of a reconcilia-
tion. It ignores the legally enforceable liability 
of a hu·sband and father to support his wife and 
child to the extent of his reasonable ability.'' 
* * * * 
''If, therefore, in addition to the legal lia-
bility, there was shown an earning power and 
capacity of the deceased, such that, had he lived, 
the legal right t.o p,ecuniary assistance or support 
might have been enforced as a thing real and 
measurable, pecuniarily valuable, then it cannot 
be said, as a matter of law, that there was no 
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reasonable expectation of such assistance or sup-
port, even though it had not theretofore been 
Yoluntarily given. Such legal liability accom-
panied by proof of ability of the deceased to 
have met the legal duty also meets the other 
requisite read into the act by the United States 
Supreme Court in the \Treeland decision in defin-
ing 'the pecuniary loss and damage' as 'one 
which can be measured by some standard.' The 
legally enforceable liability and the actual ability 
of the deceased to have met it furnishes a ·stand-
ard of measurement pecuniary in its nature, just 
as would be furnished by the antecedent volun-
tary performance of the legal duty. ·To hold 
otherwise would be to hold the right to enforce 
assistance or support by the wife and child a 
thing of no pecuniary value. This, so far as we 
are advised, no court has ever held.'' 
The same legal p-rinciple is set forth in Gilliam v. 
S·outhern Ry. Co., 108 ~s. C.195, 93 S. E. 865, 86-6: 
'' * * * Some 16 or 18 years before, McBride 
married the woman, and had by her the child 
for whose benefit the action was brought. After 
living with his wife about a year, he abandoned 
her and his child. There was no evidence that 
he afterwards contributed anything to the sup"" 
port of either of them; nor was there any evi-
dence that he did not, except as that was infer-
able from the fact that he had not lived with 
them or communicated with them. ·There was evi-
dence that, after he abandoned her, his wife lived 
in the house with another man, and that she had 
another child.'' 
• • * • 
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"t: ·~ * Defendant moved f.or a directed ver-
dict on two grounds, which are renewed here. 
The first is that there was no evidence that the 
beneficial plaintiffs sustained any actual pecuni-
ary loss. by the death of McBride; and the second 
is that, as his death was instantaneous, there was 
no survival of the right of action for his pain 
and suffering. 
'' A·s to the first ground, the motion was prop-
erly refused. The law imposes upon every man 
the duty of supporting his wife and minor un-
married children; and, in this state, any able-
bodied man who, without just cause or excuse, 
ab·andons or fails to supply the actual necessaries 
of life to his wif·e or to his minor unmarried 
child or ·children dependent upon him, is. guilty 
of a misdemeanor. Crim. Code, Sec. 697; State 
v. English, 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721, L.R.A. 
1915F, 977. Therefore, prima facie and p~resump­
tively, the widow and minor unmartied child of 
deceased had a legal pecuniary interest in the 
continuance of his life. The fact that he had 
abandoned them and had failed to perform the 
duty impoB.ed upon him by the law did not absolve 
him from the oblig~tion, nor deprive them of the 
right to have it enforced. The evidence did not 
warrant the court in holding, as matter of law, 
that the wife had forfeited her right of support 
by her -conduct. As to that, the evidence made 
an issue for the jury, under prop·er instructions. 
Besides, there was no evidence that the right 
of the child, if ·she then was, or should thereafter 
during minority become, depen.dent was not still 
existent; and the action was brought for her bene-
fit as well as the wife's. 
''When the relation between deceased and 
the beneficial plaintiff is that of husband and 
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"~ife or parent and 1ninor child, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, actual pecunial'y loss 
""'ill be presumed from the death. Minneapolis 
& St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 
66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 9·95 ; Ingersoll v. 
Detroit, etc., Railroad Co., 163 Mich. 268, 128 
N. W. 227, 32 L.R.A. (N. S.) 362; Fogarty v. 
Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 74 Waah. 397, 
133 Pac. 609, L.R.A. 1916C, 800; note in L.R.A. 
1916E, 127, 144, 148." 
Davis' Adm'r et al. v. C·incinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. 
Co., 172 Ky. 55, 188 S. W. 1061, 1063, is a case which 
indicates that it was error for the trial judge to leave 
to the jury the question of whether or not a dependent 
child had any right to expect pecuniary benefit from her 
deceased father. The Kentucky court pointed out that 
the right of a child for support from her father was a 
right which could be adjusted to accommodate the needs 
of the child and the ability of the father to pay. That 
principle is, of course, applicable in the present case for 
Mrs. Lucus could certainly, if the need arose, insist on 
an adjustment upward of the decree of the California 
court providing Frank Lucus could afford to pay an 
increase in the support money. The Kentucky court in 
the Davis case, discussing this principle, stated as fol-
lows: 
'' * * * By the judgment of divorce the wife 
was given the custody of the child, and the ·de-
ceas-ed, who was the defendant in that suit, was 
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adjudged and ordered to pay his wife the sum 
of $300 in support of their infant child. This sum 
he was nrdered to pay in installments of $25 
every three months. There is nothing said in the 
judgment indicating that this is .the only sum 
which he will ever be called upon to pay in sup-
port of his child, and that it is a well-known rule 
of law in this· ·state that such judgments may he 
opened up at any tinie, by ap:p:ropriate proceed-
ings, and additional allowances made, if the proof 
on such proceedings justifies it. Mor·eover, the 
child was not a party to that .p:roceeding, and 
the judgment ordering the allowance is by no 
means binding on it. Notwithstanding thes-e facts, 
the defendant was permitted: to· introduce the 
judgmen.t and read. -it· to .the jury upon the trial, 
over the objections of the phiintiff. We think this 
serious error~ A·s we shall hereafter see, the 
child, as a dependent upon its father, was ~ntitled . 
to recover the pecuniary benefits, which, as mani~ 
fes.ted by the proof, it had a right ·to expect from 
its father, who wa·s under a· legal obligation to 
support and supply it with necessities during.its 
infancy, and these benefits cannot in the l,ea·.st be 
augmented or .diminished by a jud~ent in a col-
lateral procee.ding to which the person entitled to 
them was in no sense a pnrty. · Whatever effect 
the judgment might have. as between the husband 
and. wife in regard to any sums w4ich he might 
be adjudged to pay her .. cannot affect the rights 
of the chi~d: which it may have in the continued 
life of its father._ We, th'erefore, think that the 
objections of plaintiff, in this particular, are well 
· taken.'' · 
The principle, o_f. :.the right to involuntary contribu-
tions from a person .... having a legal' duty .to support ha.s. 
{, · .... 
. -~ . 
. ~ ·, 
, I 
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been recognized and applied for a great number of · 
years. In Ingersoll v. D-etroit & llJ. Ry. Co., 163 Mich. 
268, 128 N. ''T· 22·7, 229, the court had before it a case 
wherein the trial court judge had directed a verdict 
against plaintiff after counsel's opening statement. In 
discussing the facts, the court set them down as follows: 
'' * * * It appears that the marriage was lawful 
that the child was born as a result of such mar-
riage, that at the time the deceased was injured 
and died the wife did not know where he was, 
and that he had never contributed anything to 
her support nor that of the child. The plaintiff 
contends that contributions of a husband and 
father may be voluntary, or they may be forced; 
that the law would compel decedent to contribute 
to the widow during her life, and to the child dur-
ing its minority; that by death she and the child 
lost this resource which the law gives, whether 
it waa a voluntary, or an involuntary, contribu-
tion; that the common and statute law -of Minne-
sota, where the marriage took place, of Wiscon-
sin, where the widow and child resided at the 
time of the death, and of this state, where the 
death took place, would compel the decedent to 
support his wife and child; and that this furnishes 
a basis on which damages may be asses·s.ed hy the 
jury, just as the court could assess 'damages, or 
fix liability, against decedent, had he been ar-
raigned before it for a failure to contribute to 
their support. The defendant urges that no basis 
for damagea was furnished in the opening state-
ment of counsel; that the wife and child had no 
reason to expect the husband and father to con-
tribute to their support; that damages must be 
proved by the circumstances, by capacity to earn, 
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and by disposition to contribute pecuniarily to 
the aid.'' 
It then proceeded to discuss in a scholarly fashion 
the law concerning the involuntary contributions as the 
basis for assessing damages. On this subject it states: 
"It is urged by defendant that there was no 
basis for assessing damages. Had decedent been 
proceeded against to compel him to support his 
wife and child, the same difficulty would have 
been encountered; and yet we think the court 
would have had no difficulty after learning all 
of the facts to fix a reasonable basis from which 
to determine the amount. Had this man been 
killed by a negligent act, an hour after his mar-
riage, and before he had ever contributed a cent 
to the support of his wife, would it be contended 
that she had not suffered pecuniary loss thereby~ 
It would seem not. What would be the basis of 
assessing damages in such a case~ We think 
that they would be determined by showing the 
circum·stances, and by evidence of the probabil-
ities, under proper rules, as in suits brought by 
parents to recover damages in case of the negli-
gent death of a young. child, who had never earned 
a dollar. Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 74 Mich. 
20, 41 N. W. 847. In this case it app.ears that the 
husband had abandoned his wife through no 
fault of hers. 
"Similar questions have been before the 
courts of other states. In 6 Thompson's Com-
mentaries on the Law of Negligence, at section 
7054, the rule is stated as follows: 'The widow 
is not prevented from maintaining an action for 
the death of her husband by negligence, by the 
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unless she has forfeited the right to support from 
him by leading an abandoned life. Nor will a 
child be prevented from recovering for the death 
of his father by the fact that the father had lived 
away from him for many years, and had not con-
tributed anything to the support of his wife or 
child'.'' 
"Under the circumstances of this case should 
not the question of what, if any sum, might the 
widow and child, be reasonably expected to re-
ceive from the deceased, have been submitted to 
the jury~ Can it be said as matter of law that 
the wife would never learn the whereabouts of 
he·r husband and proceed against him for sup·-
port?'' 
·The court cites s.everal cases in support of its 
opinion. Two of particular interest are: D·allas· R. C;o. 
v. Spieker, 61 Tex. 427, 48 Am. Rep~. 297, and B. & 0. 
R. Co. v. State, for Use of Chambers, 81 Md. 371, 32 
Atl. 201. It then conclu'ded that the circuit court ·should 
have permitted the jury to determine the liability of 
defendant and assess plaintiff's damages for contribu-
tions voluntary or forced that would probably have been 
made by deceased in favor of the widow during her 
probable life, if not exceeding the probable life of de-
cedent and for the child during its mino.rity. 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11 was in all 
respects a prop·er and accurate application of the law 
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of the United States and the State of Ultah to the evih 
dence before the jury. It was an instruction to which 
Plaintiff ag matter of law was entitled. The court not 
only refused plaintiff's instruction but failed and ne-
glected to instruct the jury in any way that Edith Lucus 
was entitled to involuntary contributions from Frank 
Lucus. This right to involuntary contributions is beyond 
possible doubt. In our res·earch we have failed to find 
any case which holds that involuntary contributions 
should not be considered in assessing the damages to 
a widow, and we feel confident that there will he no 
authority cited by defendant which will so indicate. 
Mrs. Lucus was confident that her husband would 
return to her. She in no way abandoned her claim for 
support from him, searching diligently for him, and 
making numerous inquiries in an attempt to discover 
his whereabouts. The failure of the court to instruct 
the jury that Mrs. Lucus was entitled to involuntary 
contributiori·a left the jury without any information con-
cerning that valuable right. We submit that the failure 
and refusal by the court to instruct on the right to in-
voluntary contributions when considered together with 
Instruction No. 9 ( J.R. 210) _,'that the mere fact that 
Edith Lucus was the legal wife of Frank Lucus 'at the 
time of his death is not sufficient evidence to prove that 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages for his 
'death in this action,'' is gross and p~rejudicial · error 
depriving Edith Lucus. of her most valuable right. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the trial court committed 
grievous prejudicial errors, both of omission and com-
mission in his instructions and in the erroneous admis-
sion of prejudicial evidence, and plaintiff should be 
granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK 
& ROBERTS, 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff amd 
App.elZoot. 
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